For individual freedom without inequality
For individual freedom without inequality
Critiquing Harari’s claim of a contradiction in liberal values
Part 3.1 in my critique of Big History in Harari’s Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, a book which has sold over 21 million copies in 65 languages, been embraced in Silicon Valley, and endorsed by the likes of Obama, Zuckerberg and Gates. See the full series to date.
Can we consistently value both equality and individual freedom?
In one of several arguments Harari makes against egalitarianism in Sapiens, he claims that these two liberal values contradict one another, in an irreconcilable manner.
He raises two points:
“Equality can be ensured only by curtailing the freedoms of those who are better off.”
“Guaranteeing that every individual will be free to do as he wishes inevitably short-changes equality.”[1]
However, the kinds of freedoms which would be reduced by equality, freedoms exclusive to “those who are better off," the freedom to dominate our workplaces, our judicial systems, our elections, are not valued by those who consistently value both individual freedom and equality—just as the abolitionists valued the freedom and equality of those enslaved but not the freedom of the plantation owners to own the slaves.
And “[g]uaranteeing that every individual will be free to do as he wishes” is not something that anyone really values, much less egalitarians. For example, no one thinks anyone should be free to murder or assault “as he wishes.”
Let’s break down Harari’s argument—not just because it’s problematic in its own right, but because it represents a hindrance in our ability to imagine a better society.
A contradiction in values?
Harari presents a claim about the irreconcilability of these two fundamental values, as if they contradict in a universal or logical manner—such that they cannot both be realized:
Ever since the French Revolution, people throughout the world have gradually come to see both equality and individual freedom as fundamental values. Yet the two values contradict each other. Equality can be ensured only by curtailing the freedoms of those who are better off. Guaranteeing that every individual will be free to do as he wishes inevitably short-changes equality. The entire political history of the world since 1789 can be seen as a series of attempts to reconcile this contradiction.[2]
On the surface level, the passage makes sense—so what’s the problem?
First, you can obviously value the freedoms of the individual without “[g]uaranteeing that every individual will be free to do as he wishes;” in other words, you can value individual freedom to the extent that it impinges on the freedoms of others: promoting things like freedom to healthcare and housing, but not freedom to dominate, freedom to exploit, abuse or enslave others.
Nobody who consistently advocates for equality and individual freedom wants a world where everyone is “free to do as he wishes;” I think you’d have a difficult time finding anyone who really wants everyone to be free in this such an absolute sense—assuming, for example, we all agree nobody should be free to murder, or to drive on the wrong side of the road through a city because one feels like it.
Second, the reasoning he gives about “the freedoms of those who are better off” presupposes the existence of inequality: a distinction of class between “those who are better off” and everyone else.
Even by his own reasoning, equality only necessarily comes into conflict with individual freedom when the latter is contingent upon inequality—for a simple example, the “freedom” to own slaves. In other words, these values would only conflict in cases in which the individual freedoms reduced by equality are those which are enjoyed exclusively, or if you will, unequally, characteristic of “those who are better off” than the rest of society.
In cases in which individual freedoms are not dependent upon unequal distribution of society's wealth, and instead are enjoyed by all, there’s obviously no contradiction with a value in equality. Again, the abolitionists, who obviously valued individual freedom and equality, did not value the exclusive freedoms held by the plantation owners. There’s no contradiction of values there.
A contradiction in class interests
Thus, what Harari touches on is a contradiction in interests contingent upon the actual existence of class—certain individuals, the minority of “those who are better off,” have a real interest in opposing equality because it would reduce or erase the exclusive types of class-based individual freedoms they have.
The interests a working-class person has in greater equality and individual freedom—more democracy in the workplace and more time away from work, for example—stands in opposition to a capitalists’ interests in maintaining and increasing their exclusive freedoms afforded by wealth and domination over production and thus the interests they have in maintaining inequality.
If you’re hung up by a value in the freedom for the minority of property owners of land and capital to maintain their disproportionate control over our workplaces and governments, then you're also at least somewhat wedded to inequality.
Equality and individual freedom – imagine that!
My goal in this essay was not to fully articulate a post-capitalist world that addresses all the possible complexities around maximizing equality and individual freedom, but rather to demonstrate the basic problems I see in Harari’s argument, the kind of argument which effectively limits our ability to imagine such a world.
A post-capitalist world of equality and individual freedom is not beyond our imagination, and, as an egalitarian, I don’t think it should be solely the business of a select few to imagine and decide the future of our society; we should all have access to such business, and why not start now?
I think such a world will no doubt require some kinds of democratically decided incentives for individuals and groups of individuals to innovate and do extraordinary things with their lives that benefit society; maybe some form of market will exist; but it’s not beyond imagination to conceive of such a society, wherein extraordinary individuals whose abilities are generally better supported than they are now are nonetheless not enabled to gain such disproportionate amounts of wealth so as to dominate our workplaces and governments; a world wherein democracy in our workplaces allows for production based on needs and uses rather than for the sake of maximizing profits for a lucky few; where we thus have more free time for ourselves, families, friends, hobbies, etc.—in short, greater individual freedom via greater equality.
Notes
[1]. Harari, Sapiens (New York: HarperCollins, 2015), 164.
[2]. Ibid.
Thanks for making this important point, Kevin. I don't think individual freedom and inequality are mutually exclusive either. If we managed our economies properly, we'd all have both. We'd all be comfortably housed, have enough to eat and the ability to develop our fullest potentials.
YNH is an Israeli. Nuff said.